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CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM AND GUNS: THE 
IRRESISTIBLE MOVEMENT MEETS THE 
IMMOVABLE OBJECT 
David E. Patton* 
ABSTRACT 
The number of people incarcerated for federal firearm convictions has 
increased ten-fold in the past 30 years. One of the biggest sources of the increase 
is a Department of Justice initiative known as “Operation Triggerlock” in which 
people who are arrested by state and local police for gun possession are 
prosecuted in federal court for the express purpose of imposing more severe 
prison sentences. The people prosecuted are overwhelmingly people of color. 
Both Republican and Democratic politicians have supported the prosecutions: 
the former as part of an overall law and order agenda and as a way to forestall 
broader gun control legislation, and the latter as part of a larger effort to 
regulate guns and to protect against criticism from the right about lack of 
enforcement of the laws already on the books. This Article examines the history 
of the prosecutions, including the policy reasons for them and the research on 
their impact on crime which shows that the prosecutions have little to no impact. 
The Article then reviews the various criticisms of the prosecutions, including 
stark racial disparity, contribution to mass incarceration, harm to principles of 
federalism, diminished civil liberties, and lack of effectiveness. It argues that the 
uncertain benefits to public safety do not outweigh the known damage to fairness 
and equality in the criminal justice system. Lastly, the Article considers the 
prospects for reform in light of bipartisan support for criminal justice reform 
generally and concludes that while minor reforms may come from Congress and 
the Judiciary, any significant change is unlikely without a shift in charging 
policy from the Department of Justice. 
INTRODUCTION 
Three decades ago, federal prosecutors began to fundamentally change the 
nature of their work. They shifted focus from crimes with obvious interstate 
connections to crimes that were once thought of as purely local.1 No single 
 
 * Executive Director, Federal Defenders of New York; Adjunct Professor, NYU School of Law. Thank 
you to the Emory Law Journal editorial team for their work on this Article.  
 1 Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties: Shooting Down the 
Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1660–68 (2002); David E. Patton, 
Guns, Crime Control, and a Systemic Approach to Federal Sentencing, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1427, 1440–41 
PATTON_8.18.20 8/19/2020 11:07 AM 
1012 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1011 
initiative captures this change better than “Operation Triggerlock.”2 Announced 
by Attorney General Richard Thornburgh in 1991, Triggerlock led to 
widespread federal prosecutions of so-called “felon-in-possession” cases.3 
Using the law passed in 1968 making it a federal crime for anyone previously 
convicted of a felony to possess a gun, federal prosecutors around the country 
began coordinating with local police to charge people in federal court with 
simple gun possession.4 The people arrested need not have used the gun in a 
crime or traveled across state lines to be charged—the mere possession along 
with a criminal history was enough.5 And if the person possessing the gun had 
the right number and kind of prior convictions, he (almost all were men) faced 
a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal 
Act.6 Others who possessed the gun in connection with a drug crime or another 
specified offense were subject to steep mandatory, consecutive sentences on top 
of the sentences for the underlying crime, sometimes resulting in the equivalent 
of life sentences.7 
These changes significantly contributed to steep increases in incarceration, 
particularly among men of color. In the first twenty years after Thornburgh’s 
announcement, the number of people serving time in federal prison for weapons 
possession jumped dramatically, a nearly tenfold increase from approximately 
3,400 (5.8% of all federal prisoners) in 1990 to over 32,000 (15.1% of all federal 
prisoners) in 2011.8 Although there have been fluctuations in the number of 
cases over the years, to this day the number of people incarcerated in federal 
prison for weapons offenses remains approximately 32,000.9 And from the 
beginning of Triggerlock to the present, the vast majority of those prosecuted 
 
(2011); Daniel Richman, “Project Exile” and the Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement Authority, 43 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 369, 374–75, 379 (2001) [hereinafter Richman, “Project Exile”]; Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, 
and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34 CRIME & JUST. 377, 395–98 (2006) [hereinafter Richman, Violent 
Crime Federalism]; see also JAMES A. STRAZELLA, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 17–18 (1998). 
 2 Beale, supra note 1, at 1675; Patton, supra note 1; Richman, “Project Exile”, supra note 1, at 374–75; 
Richman, Violent Crime Federalism, supra note 1, at 396–97. 
 3 Beale, supra note 1, at 1675; Patton, supra note 2; Richman, “Project Exile”, supra note 1, at 374–75; 
Richman, Violent Crime Federalism, supra note 1, at 396–97. 
 4 Patton, supra note 1. 
 5 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012). 
 6 § 924(e). 
 7 § 924(c). 
 8 Table 6.0023.2013: Prisoners Under the Jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, SOURCEBOOK 
CRIM. JUST. STAT.: U. ALB., https://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t600232013.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 
2020). 
 9 Inmate Statistics: Offenses, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_ 
inmate_offenses.jsp (last updated Jan. 4, 2020). 
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have been people of color. In 2018, consistent with most years, approximately 
72% of people sentenced for federal firearm offenses were Black or Hispanic.10  
Although Democrats and Republicans agree on little when it comes to gun 
control, federal felon-in-possession prosecutions have bridged the gap. The 
prosecutions are consistent with Democrats’ efforts to restrict gun ownership 
and useful to Republicans’ resistance to broader gun control regulation. And, of 
course, there is the matter of who gets charged. The vast majority are poor people 
of color, not exactly the Republican base.11 And in the 1990s when the initiatives 
began, Clinton Democrats, including many influential black politicians, were 
supporters of a host of “tough-on-crime” initiatives despite the impact on 
communities of color.12  
But the politics of criminal justice have changed dramatically in the past 
several years. Conservative groups like Right on Crime, Americans for Tax 
Reform, and Prison Fellowship have pushed to reduce America’s extraordinarily 
high rates of incarceration.13 They have done so on libertarian, fiscal, and 
religious grounds.14 And liberals, recovering from 1990s Clinton-era policies, 
are doing the same on humanitarian and racial justice grounds.15 The confluence 
has led to a public dialogue unimaginable a decade ago about reducing sentences 
and reigning in prosecutions. Books like Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim 
Crow, which argues that mass incarceration is a perpetuation of American’s dark 
legacy of slavery and segregation, and Bryan Stevenson’s Just Mercy, which 
 
 10 Race of Federal Offenders by Type of Crime: Fiscal Year 2018, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, https:// 
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2018/Table05. 
pdf (showing 25.6% of people sentenced for federal firearm offenses were non-Hispanic White, 52.8% were 
Hispanic, and 18.7% were Black) (last visited Mar. 22, 2020). 
 11 Alec Tyson, The 2018 Midterm Vote: Divisions by Race, Gender, Education, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 8, 
2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/11/08/the-2018-midterm-vote-divisions-by-race-gender-
education/; An Examination of the 2016 Electorate, Based on Validated Voters, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 9, 2018), 
https://www.people-press.org/2018/08/09/an-examination-of-the-2016-electorate-based-on-validated-voters/. 
 12 See, e.g., JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 
3–14 (2017). 
 13 See, e.g., Bruce DuMont, The Christian Case for Criminal Justice Reform, REAL CLEAR POL. (Dec. 19, 
2018), http://realclearpolitics.com/articles/2018/12/19/the_christian_case_for_criminal_justice_refom_138959. 
html; Bill Keller, Where Right Meets Left, MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 20, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject. 
org/2015/02/20/where-right-meets-left; The Conservative Case for Reform, RIGHT ON CRIME, http:// 
rightoncrime.com/the-conservative-case-for-reform/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2020). 
 14 Supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 15 See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Astead W. Herndon, ‘Lock the S.O.B.s Up’: Joe Biden and the Era of 
Mass Incarceration, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/25/us/joe-biden-crime-
laws.html (reviewing Joe Biden’s and other Democrats’ role in passing “tough-on-crime” legislation in the 1980s 
and 1990s which they are now apologizing for and backtracking from). 
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details the author’s fight to reform the criminal justice system, have become 
bestsellers and have entered the mainstream discourse.16  
Actual reforms have been slow to follow the discourse. They range from 
significant in some states, including legalization of recreational marijuana,17 bail 
reform,18 and the election of prosecutors running on reform platforms (though 
just how reformist they are is debatable),19 to baby steps in the federal system, 
including a slight scaling back on certain mandatory minimum sentences, 
retroactive application of a reduction in penalties for crack cocaine, and the 
possibility of earlier release for some incarcerated people (though notably not 
nearly all).20 
So what has this meant for federal felon-in-possession prosecutions? So far, 
nothing. Numbers dipped slightly from the Bush Administration to the Obama 
Administration, but in the last year of the Obama presidency, prosecutions were 
heading up and were more than 50% higher than in the last year of the Clinton 
Administration.21 The Trump Administration has pushed them higher still and is 
on track to bring the highest number of firearm prosecutions ever, surpassing the 
previous high-water mark of 2004.22 The same political dynamics surrounding 
gun control, and federal gun prosecutions, seem as firmly entrenched as ever.23  
 
 16 See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2010); BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY 
(2014). 
 17 Marijuana Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 17, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
civil-and-criminal-justice/marijuana-overview.aspx (showing eleven states and the District of Columbia). 
 18 See, e.g., NAT’L TASK FORCE ON FINES, FEES, & BAIL PRACTICES, BAIL REFORM: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 
BASED ON RESEARCH AND EXPERIENCE (2019). 
 19 See, e.g., Allan Smith, Progressive DAs Are Shaking Up the Criminal Justice System. Pro-Police 
Groups Aren’t Happy, NBC NEWS (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/ 
these-reform-prosecutors-are-shaking-system-pro-police-groups-aren-n1033286. For a critical look at how 
progressive these prosecutors are, see generally Note, The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecution”, 132 HARV. 
L. REV. 748 (2018). 
 20 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5198–203, 5210–11, 5220. For an 
explanation of the bill, see generally NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45558, THE FIRST STEP ACT 
OF 2018: AN OVERVIEW (2019).  
 21 Federal Weapons Prosecutions Rise for Third Consecutive Year, TRAC REP. (Nov. 29, 2017), https:// 
trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/492/ (showing prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 922 were 4,461 in FY 2000 and 
6,734 in FY 2016).  
 22 Federal Weapons Prosecutions Continue to Climb in 2019, TRAC REP. (June 5, 2019), https://trac.syr. 
edu/tracreports/crim/560/. 
 23 See, e.g., Vittoria Elliot, Trump Quietly Backs Away from Stricter Gun Law Proposals After Mass 
Shootings, INDEPENDENT (NOV. 1, 2019, 10:19 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-
politics/trump-gun-reform-laws-mass-shootings-nra-a9181831.html; David Shortell et al., Proposal to Expand 
Background Checks Floated on Hill but Trump Has Yet to Sign Off on It or Any Other Gun Plan, CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/18/politics/guns-background-checks-congress-trump/index.html (last updated 
Sept. 18, 2019). 
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This Article examines the past three decades of federal gun possession 
prosecutions. How did they come about in such large numbers? What have 
scholars learned about the prosecutions’ impact on violent crime? How have the 
prosecutions contributed to problems in the criminal justice system that are now 
widely acknowledged? Do trade-offs exist, and, if so, are they worth it? Three 
decades into this experiment, what have we learned, and where might we be 
headed in light of those lessons?  
Part I briefly discusses the history of federal gun possession prosecutions, 
including a review of the research about the prosecutions’ impact on crime rates. 
The research shows that we know relatively little about how the prosecutions 
impact crime (consistent with the little we know about what affects crime rates 
generally), but the few studies done suggest slight to no impact. Part II reviews 
the various criticisms of the prosecutions, including stark racial disparity, 
contribution to mass incarceration, harm to principles of federalism, diminished 
civil liberties, and lack of effectiveness. I argue that the uncertain benefits to 
public safety (as well as the real possibility that the prosecutions actually harm 
public safety) do not outweigh the known damage to fairness and equality in the 
criminal justice system. Lastly, in Part III, I examine the future of the 
prosecutions by reviewing recent events in Congress, the Judiciary, and the 
Executive. I conclude that while minor reforms have come from Congress and 
the Judiciary in the past few years, and more are possible, fundamental change 
will likely only come from a shift in charging policy from the Department of 
Justice.  
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF FEDERAL GUN POSSESSION PROSECUTIONS 
A. The Origin Story 
The extraordinary increase in gun possession prosecutions did not begin with 
a new law. The federal law criminalizing gun possession for anyone with a prior 
felony conviction was passed in 1968, and for twenty years it remained lightly 
enforced.24 Light enforcement was consistent with the notion of a limited role 
for the federal government in matters of local crimes. In the nearly 200 years of 
country’s existence, federal involvement in criminal law had grown—but only 
to a point.25 Initially reserved for crimes such as piracy and treason, federal law 
enforcement had grown in the twentieth century to include a broader array of 
offenses, but ones that still seemed to offer obvious advantages to federal rather 
 
 24 See Beale, supra note 1, at 1644; supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text. 
 25 See Richman, Violent Crime Federalism, supra note 1, at 383–89. 
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than local intervention: interstate transportation of stolen property (particularly 
cars), interstate kidnapping, immigration offenses, large-scale criminal 
organizations, and perhaps more controversially, drug and Prohibition-era 
alcohol offenses. The result was that after Prohibition was repealed, the federal 
prison population remained incredibly constant. In 1940, there were 24,360 
federal inmates.26 In 1980, there were 24,252.27  
But in the 1970s and 1980s, with rising crime rates and a shifting political 
dynamic that included the Republican “Southern Strategy” with its race-based 
appeals to tough-on-crime policies, the politics of crime took the national 
stage.28 In 1984 Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, which 
ushered in the federal sentencing guidelines and a host of tougher penalties for 
drug crimes,29 as well as the Armed Career Criminal Act, which imposed a 
fifteen-year mandatory minimum for possessing a gun after having been 
convicted of three qualifying felonies.30 Two years later, in the wake of the 
overdose death (from powder cocaine) of star basketball player Len Bias, 
Congress passed a wave of new mandatory minimum drug sentences, notably 
creating the infamous 100-to-1 ratio for crack to powder cocaine with its 
devastating racial disparities.31 But even with the new laws on the books and the 
increase in drug prosecutions, gun possession prosecutions did not immediately 
follow.32 
The turning point came with Thornburgh’s announcement in 1991 of Project 
Triggerlock. Although federal firearm prosecutions had increased steadily 
throughout the 1980s, those prosecutions were not the result of any formalized 
program and were likely incident to overall increases in federal prosecution, 
 
 26 Id. at 389. 
 27 Id.  
 28 Tom LoBianco, Report: Aide Says Nixon’s War on Drugs Targeted Blacks, Hippies, CNN (Mar. 24, 
2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/23/politics/john-ehrlichman-richard-nixon-drug-war-blacks-hippie/ 
index.html (quoting President Nixon’s former domestic policy chief, John Ehrlichman, about the political 
strategy of using the criminal justice system to battle Nixon’s “two enemies: the antiwar left and black people”); 
see also Emily Dufton, The War on Drugs: How President Nixon Tied Addiction to Crime, ATLANTIC (Mar. 26, 
2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/03/the-war-on-drugs-how-president-nixon-tied-addiction-to-
crime/254319/; Rick Perlstein, Lee Atwater’s Infamous 1981 Interview on the Southern Strategy, NATION 
(Nov. 13, 2012), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/exclusive-lee-atwaters-infamous-1981-interview-
southern-strategy/ (quoting the racist remarks of Lee Atwater in explaining the Republican’s “Southern 
Strategy” and noting that as George H.W. Bush’s campaign manager, Atwater ran the infamous Willie Horton 
ad with its race-baiting appeal to tough on crime policies).  
 29 Richman, Violent Crime Federalism, supra note 1, at 394–95. 
 30 Id. at 394. 
 31 Adam Davidson, Learning from History in Changing Times: Taking Account of Evolving Marijuana 
Laws in Federal Sentencing, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 2105, 2130–34 (2016). 
 32 See Richman, “Project Exile”, supra note 1, at 395–96. 
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particularly the increase in drug and organized crime prosecutions where 
firearms were involved.33 Project Triggerlock changed that. The stated goal was 
for federal prosecutors to “protect the public by putting the most dangerous 
offenders in prison for as long as the law allows” by using the “full force of 
federal sentences with a commitment to no plea bargaining.”34 
Daniel Richman has written extensively about the history of Triggerlock and 
notes that it was announced at a time of heated debate about the Brady Bill, a 
package of gun control measures that Democrats generally favored and 
Republicans opposed.35 At the time of the announcement, the Bush 
Administration strongly opposed the legislation, but momentum for it had been 
building, particularly with the endorsement of former President Reagan in a 
statement from George Washington University Medical Center where he had 
been treated after being shot eight years earlier.36 A political dynamic developed 
that persists to this day: Republicans opposed broad gun control legislation, and 
as part of that opposition, supported stronger law enforcement efforts against 
illegal gun possession. As Professor Richman puts it:  
Gun control minimalists support offender-specific criminal 
enforcement as an alternative to broader regulation of trafficking and 
access. And advocates of broader regulation embrace such 
enforcement programs as well, both as a shield against minimalist 
criticism and because their regulatory scheme naturally includes this 
sort of criminal enforcement.37 
Triggerlock prosecutions waxed and waned in the several years following 
Thornburgh’s announcement.38 The Clinton Administration did not disavow it; 
indeed, many of the Clinton-appointed United States Attorneys touted it.39 But 
in 1997 both sides of the political debate cheered one highly visible Triggerlock 
program that would become a template for others around the country: Project 
Exile.  
Project Exile was an initiative started by the United States Attorney’s Office 
for the Eastern District of Virginia in Richmond. It was led by the then-head of 
the Richmond office, James Comey. Comey (the now famous former FBI 
 
 33 See id. at 396. 
 34 Id. at 374 (quoting Attorney General Richard Thornburgh). 
 35 Id.  
 36 Id.  
 37 Id. at 410. 
 38 See id. at 375–76. 
 39 See id. at 376, 382. But during the time before and after the Brady Bill’s passage in 1993, Republicans 
criticized the Administration for not bringing enough prosecutions. See id. at 390. 
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Director) described it as “Triggerlock on steroids”40 and explained that it 
involved a collaboration between federal and state law enforcement whereby, 
“When a police officer finds a gun during the officer’s duties, the officer pages 
an ATF agent (twenty-four hours a day). They review the circumstances and 
determine whether a federal statute applies. If so, federal criminal prosecution is 
initiated.”41  
Far from the initial language of Triggerlock about targeting America’s “most 
dangerous offenders,”42 Exile was sweeping in its approach. If a federal statute 
applied, anyone found with a gun would be charged in federal court.43  
The U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, Helen Fahey, 
explained the advantages of federal prosecutions: lower likelihood of bail, 
harsher sentences, and a federal prison system that meant serving time in a 
distant location (hence the name “Exile”).44 Media outreach in Richmond was 
extensive, including television ads, billboards, and even coordination with 
NRA-sponsored “Eddie Eagle Gun Safety” programs for elementary school 
children.45 Within a year, Exile seemed to have a dramatic impact on homicides, 
with Richmond experiencing a 33% reduction between 1997 and 1998.46  
Exile was soon publicized and politicized nationally. Although the program 
occurred in a Democratic administration, it was Republicans who capitalized on 
its apparent success.47 The NRA made it a cornerstone of their message as gun 
control debates continued to rage, especially after the Columbine High School 
shooting in Colorado.48 The familiar dynamic played out. Gun control opponents 
insisted that additional laws and broader regulatory requirements were 
unnecessary: The laws on the books were sufficient—they just needed to be 
enforced by programs like Exile.49 And gun control proponents took what they 
could get, naturally supportive of anti-gun enforcement policies and tactically 
concerned about criticism from the right if they opposed such enforcement.  
 
 40 Id. at 379 n.63. 
 41 Id. at 379. 
 42 Id. at 374. 
 43 Id. at 370. 
 44 Id. at 379 n.66. 
 45 Id. at 380. 
 46 Id. at 381.  
 47 See id. 
 48 Id. at 384. 
 49 See id. at 382–86. 
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With both sides of the aisle on board, the number of federal gun possession 
prosecutions soon skyrocketed.50  
B. The Expansion  
Exile was widely replicated in districts throughout the country via an 
umbrella DOJ program called Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN).51 PSN was 
developed by the George W. Bush Administration and was designed to increase 
federal prosecutions and sentences as part of a broader strategy to reduce violent 
crime. In addition to the increased prosecutions, PSN strategies included: (1) 
“offender notification meetings,” adapted from a Boston program called 
Ceasefire, which involved small meetings with parolees and probationers to 
inform them of the new prosecution policies, and to offer job training and social 
services assistance; (2) media campaigns advertising the prosecution initiative; 
(3) increased home visits to parolees and probationers; and (4) research to 
identify increased criminal activity in order to increase police presence in those 
areas.52  
The PSN “toolkit,” the package of materials sent to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices 
explaining the program and acting as a guide to developing PSN initiatives, 
explained the benefits of federal gun prosecutions: longer sentences and more 
restrictive bail laws. Those “benefits” accrued even when gun cases remained in 
the state courts because of the additional leverage the possibility of federal 
prosecutions provided to local prosecutors. “In some jurisdictions, state 
prosecutors offer violent gun criminals the option of receiving a higher-than-
usual state sentence in lieu of federal prosecution, which may carry an even 
higher sentence.”53 Attorney General John Ashcroft stated that the idea was 
“disarmingly simple: federal, state, and local law enforcement officers and 
prosecutors working together to investigate, arrest, and prosecute criminals with 
guns to get the maximum penalties available under state or federal law.”54  
Since its inception in 2001, PSN has spent billions of dollars supporting state 
and federal law enforcement to carry out its programming and it has impacted 
federal prosecutions in every federal district in the country. According to 
 
 50 See id. at 380–81. 
 51 See EDMUND F. MCGARRELL ET AL., PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS - A NATIONAL PROGRAM TO 
REDUCE GUN CRIME: FINAL PROJECT REPORT iii (2009). 
 52 Id. at 9–10. 
 53 Bonita R. Gardner, Separate and Unequal: Federal Tough-on-Guns Program Targets Minority 
Communities 
for Selective Enforcement, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 305, 317 (2007). 
 54 Id. at 307 n.4. 
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subsequent studies, although many districts ramped up the prosecution 
component of PSN, the other non-prosecutorial components such as notification 
meetings and supportive services, were much less frequently and sporadically 
implemented.55 One noteworthy example of the expansion was James Comey 
personally bringing a version of Exile from Richmond to the Southern District 
of New York when he became that district’s U.S. Attorney during the George 
W. Bush Administration. It too focused almost entirely on the prosecutorial 
component of PSN.56 
C. The Impact  
Researchers conducted several studies in the 2000s in an attempt to measure 
federal gun possession prosecutions’ impact on crime rates. In 2003, Steven 
Raphael and Jens Ludwig conducted what is generally considered the most 
rigorous statistical analysis of Richmond’s homicide rates and Project Exile and 
found that the prosecutions likely had no impact.57 The highly-touted drop in 
homicides was almost certainly due to a regression to the mean. The year before 
Exile was implemented, Richmond saw a spike, and its drop was entirely 
consistent with other cities that also saw dramatic decreases without an Exile-
type program. Even within Richmond, other populations unaffected by Exile, 
namely juveniles, also saw decreases in crime. Shortly after the study was 
released, one commentator, Peter Greenwood, the founder of the RAND 
Corporation’s evidence-based criminal justice program stated: “Steven Raphael 
and Jens Ludwig have demonstrated fairly conclusively that one of the more 
popular strategies developed during the past decade to reduce firearm violence 
is a bust. It has no impact. It does not work.”58 
Other studies were slightly more qualified. Richard Rosenfeld and others 
studied Exile along with several other law enforcement initiatives and concluded 
that the results in Richmond “inspire somewhat greater confidence in the 
existence of a difference between Richmond’s firearm homicide trend and the 
average trend for the sample [of the ninety-five largest U.S. cities], although the 
differences may have been quite small.”59 
 
 55 See MCGARRELL ET AL., supra note 51, at 138, 142 (noting that of the 252 large cities in which PSN 
was implemented, 170 were considered “low dosage” with “dosage” referring to the various components of the 
programming). 
 56 See id. at 7. 
 57 See Steven Raphael & Jens Ludwig, Prison Sentence Enhancements: The Case of Project Exile, in 
EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 254 (Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003). 
 58 Peter Greenwood, Comment, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 280 
(Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003). 
 59 Richard Rosenfeld et al., Did Ceasefire, Compstat, and Exile Reduce Homicide?, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & 
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In 2009 the Department of Justice commissioned its own broader study of 
PSN nationwide.60 Perhaps not surprisingly, the study painted a rosier picture of 
the program’s impact than did the earlier independent studies. But even 
accepting the report’s conclusions of a 4.1% decrease in crime in PSN target 
cities as compared to a 0.9% drop in crime in non-PSN target cities, it is hard to 
say much about the impact of the gun prosecutions alone. Because of PSN’s 
multi-pronged approach and the wide variation in implementation of the 
different prongs (from community outreach to law enforcement training to 
media campaigns) the study does not provide valid data about federal 
prosecutions and crime rates. A more detailed study of a PSN program in 
Chicago showed a significant impact on homicide rates, but attributed the 
majority of the impact to (1) the “forums” in which people recently placed on 
probation or parole attended meetings with community members to discuss 
increased gun prosecutions; (2) crime in the neighborhood; (3) why they were 
collaborating to reduce it, and various available social services such as substance 
abuse treatment; (4) mental health counseling; and (5) job training and 
placement.61 According to the researchers, “the only variable not to have a 
significant effect was the person-month sentence received from PSN 
prosecution.”62  
The 2009 study appears to be the last effort to empirically assess the impact 
of PSN. 
II. CRITICISMS OF FEDERAL GUN POSSESSION PROSECUTIONS 
There have been a host of criticisms of federal gun possession prosecutions. 
They span the political spectrum and have been leveled for many years.  
A. Racial Disparity  
Racial disparity has been a part of felon-in-possession prosecutions from the 
start. In an equal protection challenge to Project Exile in Richmond, the parties 
stipulated that 90% of defendants were African-American, and the court 
 
PUB. POL’Y 419, 438 (2005) (emphasis omitted). 
 60 See MCGARRELL ET AL., supra note 51, at iii–vi.  
 61 See Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Attention Felons: Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in 
Chicago, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 223, 231–32 (2007); see also DAVID M. KENNEDY, DETERRENCE AND 
CRIME PREVENTION 4, 11 (2009) (referring to the Papachristos study as the “best evaluation to date” and 
summarizing other studies and concluding, “[i]n general, the certainty, and to a lesser extent, the swiftness of 
sanction mattered more than the severity of sanction, to the extent that many researchers concluded that severity 
was all but or in fact irrelevant”). 
 62 Papachristos et al., supra note 61, at 260.  
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lamented “the inability of prosecutors to explain the procedure” for diverting 
cases from state court for more serious punishment in federal court which cast 
“some doubt on the assertion that race plays no role in deciding whether a case 
is to be federally prosecuted.”63 The challenge ultimately failed, and over the 
years, federal prosecutors in other districts have charged gun possession cases 
at similarly skewed rates, with the percentage of Black defendants (categories 
used by the Sentencing Commission) in many districts routinely over 80% and 
90%.64 In a 2007 article, Bonita Gardner detailed the cities and neighborhoods 
that PSN targeted and showed how the demographics of the targeted 
communities assured a stark racial imbalance.65 That skewed targeting continues 
to this day. In 2017, nationwide, over 70% of all persons sentenced in federal 
court for unlawful possession of a firearm were Black or Hispanic.66  
In addition to the location of the PSN target communities, the racial disparity 
also arises from the type of firearm offenses charged. In discussing the disparity 
in gun possession prosecutions, Gardner questioned the choice of the federal 
government to prosecute felon-in-possession cases but not the “other twenty 
major federal gun crimes—including gun trafficking, corrupt gun dealers, stolen 
guns, selling to minors, obliterating serial numbers, and lying on the background 
check form.”67 Indeed, the numbers paint a stark divide between simple 
possession prosecutions and offenses related to gun trafficking. In 2018, less 
than 5% of all federal firearm prosecutions involved trafficking or registration 
offenses.68  
Benjamin Levin recently argued that many of the critiques of the war on 
drugs apply with equal force to firearm prosecutions, and in particular, the 
decision to target those with prior felony convictions which may well “reinscribe 
the inequalities of the drug war.”69 Levin reminds us that “defining a crime is a 
political act, and the decision that an individual with a criminal record for drug 
 
 63 See United States v. Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d 304, 307 (E.D. Va. 1999); see also United States v. Thorpe, 
471 F.3d 652, 658 (6th Cir. 2006). For a full discussion of the case, see Dominique Camm, Reversing the 
Standard: The Difficulty in Proving Selective Prosecution, 31 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 93, 94–95 (2008).  
 64 See Gardner, supra note 53, at 316; Patton, supra note 2, at 1443. 
 65 See Gardner, supra note 53, at 316–17. 
 66 Race of Offenders in Each Primary Offense Category, Fiscal Year: 2017, U.S. SENTENCING 
COMMISSION, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-source 
books/2017/Table04.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2020). 
 67 Gardner, supra note 53, at 312.  
 68 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, USE OF GUIDELINES AND SPECIFIC OFFENSE CHARACTERISTICS: FISCAL 
YEAR 2018, at 55 (2018). 
 69 Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2173, 2197 (2016). 
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offenses cannot possess a gun lawfully rests on a political definition not only 
about guns, but about drugs as well.”70  
What makes these racial disparities particularly troubling is how intentional 
the prosecutorial decisions are. Federal felon-in-possession prosecutions 
overwhelmingly come from local police arrests in which the person arrested 
would otherwise face state charges.71 The decision whether to prosecute 
someone federally is not a decision between prosecution or no prosecution—it’s 
a decision between state or federal prosecution. That is, even compared to the 
enormous discretion prosecutors normally exercise, these decisions are highly 
discretionary. PSN specifically targets communities of color for punishment 
above and beyond what would already be significant punishment in state court.  
When it comes to racial disparity, some of the direct federal law enforcement 
arrests are even more troubling than the transferred state cases. They often 
involve stings by the DEA and ATF which overwhelmingly target people of 
color. A common operation that has been heavily criticized, but still persists, is 
the so-called fake “stash-house” sting.72 In the operations, federal agents use 
cooperating informants to convince people that an apartment or house contains 
hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of drugs or drug proceeds that can be 
easily burgled or robbed.73 The informant tells the target to find and bring other 
people and guns to a meet-up location.74 At the appointed location, the agents 
arrest everyone who shows up and charge them with assorted federal robbery, 
drug, and firearms charges that often carry decades of mandatory prison time.75  
Two recent selective enforcement challenges to this practice in the Southern 
District of New York show overwhelming racial disparities. In one, a survey of 
fake stash-house sting cases revealed that in the five-year period between 2013 
and 2018, the operations targeted 144 individuals, 141 of whom (97.9%) were 
Black or Latino, two of whom were Asian, and one of whom was White.76 The 
other, using slightly different data, showed that over a ten-year period, of 179 
reverse-sting defendants, none were White and all but two were Black or 
 
 70 Id. 
 71 Patton, supra note 1, at 1464. 
 72 See, e.g., Brad Heath, ATF Uses Fake Drugs, Big Bucks to Snare Suspects, USA TODAY (June 28, 
2013, 11:26 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/27/atf-stash-houses-sting-usa-today-
investigation/2457109/ (noting that more than 1,000 individuals have been prosecuted following similar “stash-
house” stings). 
 73 See, e.g., United States v. Flowers, 712 F. App’x. 492, 510 (6th Cir. 2017) (Stranch, J., concurring) 
(quoting United States v. Black, 733 F.3d 294, 302–03 (9th Cir. 2013)).  
 74 See id. (quoting Black, 733 F.3d at 302–03). 
 75 See id. (quoting Black, 733 F.3d at 302–03). 
 76 United States v. Garcia-Pena, 17 Cr. 363, 2018 WL 6985220, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
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Hispanic.77 These astonishingly skewed figures occurred in a federal district that 
is 43.1% White (non-Latino), 31.4% Latino, and 16.7% Black (non-Latino). In 
the Northern District of Illinois, only six out of ninety-four defendants charged 
in fake stash-house sting cases were White and non-Hispanic, figures the 
Seventh Circuit referred to as “troubling” in ordering limited discovery into the 
reasons and criteria for the prosecutions.78  
The constitutional challenges to the arrests and prosecutions have had mixed 
success,79 but regardless of the merits of the equal protection claims, the policy 
criticisms on racial disparity grounds are compelling. Sixth Circuit Judge Jane 
Stranch, in a concurring opinion denying a motion to dismiss on due process 
grounds, wrote: 
I write separately to express my discomfort with the governmental 
operation known as a “stash house sting.” Because these stings are 
wholly inventions of law enforcement agents, they can and do include 
powerful inducements to participate in one big “hit,” a hit that is 
conveniently large enough to qualify for mandatory minimum 
sentences. Obtaining the outsized reward is also made to look easy—
the agent is a disgruntled insider who knows when and how to stage 
these “rip-and-runs” and offers to provide all needed assistance, from 
manpower to transportation. The unseemly nature of the 
Government’s activity is emphasized by its failure to achieve its 
declared goals of jailing dangerous criminals and making our streets 
safer. Evidence showing that these hurry-up set-ups achieve the stated 
goals was not proffered and the facts here demonstrate why: no known 
dangerous individuals or criminal enterprises were researched or 
targeted and no pre-existing drug rings or conspiracies were broken 
up. In fact, this sting trapped Flowers, a gainfully employed young 
man with no criminal record. We have this result because informants 
were simply sent out into the community to gather information and 
find someone who would bite at the opportunity to make loads of 
money quickly. And, in line with sting statistics, the men recruited here 
were all African American and all from impoverished areas—as are 
 
 77 Shayna Jacobs, 10 Years. 179 Arrests. No White Defendants. DEA Tactics Face Scrutiny in New York, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/10-years-179-arrests-no-
white-defendants-dea-tactics-face-scrutiny-in-new-york/2019/12/14/f6462242-12ce-11ea-bf62-
eadd5d11f559_story.html. 
 78 United States v. Davis, 793 F.3d 712, 722 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 79 Courts have required defendants to show that similarly situated Whites could have been but were not 
targeted, a standard that is nearly impossible to meet and is a highly questionable method for detecting 
discrimination. For a thorough explanation of why this “counterfactual causal” model is so flawed, see generally 
Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Eddie Murphy and the Dangers of Counterfactual Causal Thinking About Detecting 
Racial Discrimination, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1163 (2019). 
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the overwhelming number of stash-house-sting targets across the 
nation.80 
Just as Levin reminds us that defining a crime is a political act, so too is the 
decision about whether, how, and against whom to charge a crime, and as a 
practical matter, it is likely a more significant one. And the racially disparate 
federal charging decisions in gun cases are not just a product of conservative 
political acts. . The reverse-sting and felon-in-possession prosecutions have been 
pursued by Attorneys General and U.S. Attorneys from both ends of the political 
spectrum. Legal historian Anders Walker has written about the liberal 
contribution to racial inequality in the criminal legal system and cites liberal 
support for tough on crime policies for firearms offenses as a prime example.81 
He argues that Michelle Alexander’s thesis in The New Jim Crow, comparing 
conservative wedge politics and the war on drugs to formalized racial 
segregation, misses the “current liberal enthusiasm for federal gun regulation” 
as a significant “contributor to black incarceration.”82  
B. Over-Incarceration 
Federal gun possession cases are no small part of overall federal 
prosecutions. Firearm offenses are the third highest category of federal 
prosecutions, behind only drugs and immigration.83 And they represent the 
second highest offense type of people serving time in federal prison behind only 
drugs.84 Nearly 20% of all federal prisons are incarcerated for a weapons 
offense.85 
The point of the prosecutions as stated by the originators of the programs is 
to impose harsher sentences than would otherwise be imposed in state court, and 
to drive up state court sentences by using the threat of federal prosecution as 
leverage. This last point is significant. Although the vast majority of criminal 
cases, and therefore the vast source of mass incarceration, come from state 
systems, the federal prosecutions impact those systems tremendously by 
providing state prosecutors greater power to negotiate tougher pleas.  
 
 80 Flowers, 712 F. App’x. at 508–09 (Stranch, J., concurring). 
 81 Anders Walker, The New Jim Crow? Recovering the Progressive Origins of Mass Incarceration, 41 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 845, 871 (2014). 
 82 Id. at 873.  
 83 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2018: OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES 4 (2019) 
(demonstrating that firearm offenses make up approximately 11% of federal offenses).  
 84 Inmate Statistics: Offenses, supra note 10. 
 85 Id. 
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Levin argues convincingly that “like criminal drug statutes, existing and 
proposed criminal gun possession statutes should also trigger skepticism from 
critics of mass incarceration.”86 He details the ways in which gun possession 
prosecutions and the war on drugs share the same misguided pathology of using 
the criminal law and extremely severe sentences as the regulatory tool of 
choice.87  
In the drug context, the use of criminal law to handle a public health 
crisis ultimately merged with a strong punitive streak, yielding a 
regulatory regime undergirded with violent moralism. Shaped by this 
preference for incarceration, the criminal gun statutes in the federal 
system and in many states advance a web of exponentially advancing 
sentences. Like drug crime offenses, possessory drug offenses quickly 
multiply, allowing prosecutors to stack charges and to extend 
significantly the prison term that a defendant faces. The end result is a 
legal regime that—much like drug prohibition—feeds into a growing 
carceral population.88  
Nowhere have the sentences been more troubling than in the extreme cases 
of prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Section 924(c) requires a mandatory 
five-year sentence for anyone possessing a gun “during and in relation to any 
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.”89 The penalty increases to seven 
years if the gun was brandished, and ten years if it was discharged. A sentence 
under 924(c) must run consecutively to any other sentence.90 And each “second 
or subsequent conviction” for Section 924(c) requires an additional mandatory, 
consecutive twenty-five years.91 This has meant the equivalent of life sentences 
for many people who engaged in serious criminal conduct but who were 
sentenced far more severely than the average person convicted of murder.92 As 
discussed further below, the recently passed First Step Act has ameliorated some 
of the harshest aspects of this so-called “stacking” of charges, but the law did 
not provide any retroactive relief. One well-publicized example of the harshness 
of the prosecutions was Weldon Angelos, who was sentenced in federal court in 
Salt Lake City, Utah to fifty-five years in prison at the age of twenty-five for 
 
 86 Levin, supra note 69, at 2213. 
 87 Id. at 2214–15. 
 88 Levin, supra note 69, at 2215. 
 89 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012).  
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Danielle Kaeble, Time Served in State Prisons, 2016, BUREAU JUST. STAT. (Nov. 2018), https://www. 
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp16.pdf (showing the median time served for all degrees of murder nationwide is 
13.4 years). 
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selling marijuana three times while possessing a gun.93 Just a few other cases 
include: 
 Eric Andrews, who was 19 when he engaged in several robberies 
over a one-month period of time and was sentenced in federal court 
in Philadelphia in 2006 to 311 years in prison;94 
 Kittrell Decator, who was sentenced in 1995 to 53 years in prison 
in federal court in Baltimore for three bank robberies in which 
nobody was physically injured;95 
 Ronnie Lynn Fowler, who was sentenced in 1992 to 45 years in 
prison in federal court in Dallas for five night-deposit robberies in 
which nobody was physically injured;96 
 Kevin Haynes, who was sentenced to 46 years in federal court in 
Brooklyn in 1993 for four bank robberies in which nobody was 
physically injured;97 
 Kepa Maumau, who was sentenced to 57 years in 2011 in federal 
court in Salt Lake City for a series of robberies in which nobody 
was physically injured;98 
 Ian Owens, who was sentenced to 117 years in 2005 in federal court 
in the Eastern District of Michigan for committing a series of bank 
robberies in which nobody was seriously injured;99 
 Derrick Redd, who was sentenced to 50 years in 1997 in federal 
court in Alexandria, Virginia for four bank robberies in which 
nobody was physically injured;100 
 Robert Rollings, who was sentenced to 106 years in 2001 in federal 
court in Chicago for participating in four bank robberies in which 
nobody was physically injured;101 
 
 93 Adam Liptak, Long Term in Drug Case Fuels Debate on Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2004), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/12/us/long-term-in-drug-case-fuels-debate-on-sentencing.html; Eileen Sullivan, 
Shorter Sentences, More Judicial Leeway: What the Criminal Justice Bill Would Do, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/us/politics/sentencing-prison-bill.html. In 2016, Angelos was 
resentenced and released after thirteen years of intense media coverage of his case. Jason Kitchen, After 13 Years 
in Prison, Weldon Angelos Is a Free Man, HUFFPOST (June 8, 2016, 8:14 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/ 
after-13-years-in-prison-_b_10322000. Prosecutors agreed to vacate one of the 924(c) convictions, but the 
details are sealed. Id. 
 94 United States v. Andrews, 2:05 Cr. 280 (ER) (E.D. Pa.). 
 95 Decator v. United States, No. 1:95-cr-202, 2013 WL 12344772 (D. Md. Nov. 27, 2013). 
 96 United States v. Fowler, No. 4:92-cr-177, 2012 WL 12871653 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2012). 
 97 United States v. Haynes, 93 Cr. 1043 (RJD) (E.D.N.Y.). 
 98 United States v. Maumau, No. 2:08-cr-758, 2020 WL 806121 (D. Utah Feb. 18, 2020). 
 99 United States v. Owens, 02 Cr. 226 (E.D. Mi.). 
 100 United States v. Redd, 97 Cr 06 (E.D. Va.). 
 101 United States v. Rollings, 99 Cr. 771 (N.D. Ill.). 
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 Gregory Rose, who was sentenced to 90 years in 2005 in federal 
court in Albany, New York for participating in a series of bank 
robberies in which nobody was physically injured.102  
These are only some of the dozens of cases in which “stacked” 924(c) 
convictions have mandated sentences that are wholly disproportionate to the 
conduct and far lengthier than punishment for more serious crimes.103 While the 
924(c) prosecutions are not necessarily part of a district’s Triggerlock program 
(e.g., bank robberies are usually investigated by federal law enforcement from 
the outset), they represent the more extreme end of the spectrum of federal 
firearm prosecutions’ harsh contribution to mass incarceration.  
C. Privacy and Libertarian Criticisms 
There have also been criticisms of federal gun possession prosecutions on 
libertarian grounds—beyond the mere “keep your hands off my guns” variety. 
Possessory offenses rely heavily on searches for detection. A gun kept in a 
nightstand or closet or car trunk won’t be found unless police make an effort to 
look in those places. And so they find ways to look there. In this way, the 
prosecutions contribute to an unhealthy amount of police and prosecutorial 
power. Referring to New York City’s now much-maligned “stop and frisk” 
practices, Levin notes that “it was guns as much, if not more so, than drugs that 
justified the aggressive and intrusive practice.”104 He also notes that it was guns 
more so than drugs that provided the basis for some of the broader exceptions to 
the Fourth Amendment’s restrictions on searches and seizures.105 “Even as the 
Warren Court was expanding the protections afforded to criminal defendants 
and curbing police abuses, it relied on concern for officer safety in the gun 
possession context to carve out what would become the critical exception to the 
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.”106 
Federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York have repeatedly 
fought to shield police officers who violate the Fourth Amendment in felon-in-
possession cases and were found untruthful by federal judges in suppression 
hearings.107 A New York Times investigation revealed at least twenty cases 
 
 102 United States v. Rose, 3:04 Cr. 067 (N.D.N.Y.).  
 103 For analysis and criticism of the Section 924(c) mandatory sentencing regime by the United States 
Sentencing Commission, see generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY 
MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2011).  
 104 Levin, supra note 69, at 2202. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. (footnote omitted). 
 107 David E. Patton, Policing the Poor and the Two Faces of the Justice Department, 44 FORDHAM URB. 
PATTON_8.18.20 8/19/2020 11:07 AM 
2020] CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM AND GUNS 1029 
where NYPD officers’ testimony was found to be “unreliable, inconsistent, 
twisting the truth, or just plain false” and where federal prosecutors had 
defended the conduct and no adverse personnel action was ever taken against 
the officers.108  
Many of the constitutional violations never come to light because of the 
nature of federal criminal practice in which less than 3% of cases go to trial and 
prosecutors leverage the threat of severe mandatory sentences to obtain pleas 
without a challenge to police conduct.109  
D. Federalism 
Lastly, there have also been criticisms of Triggerlock nearly from the start 
on federalism grounds. Traditional conservatives ask: Why is the federal 
government involving itself in what should rightfully be local policing? What 
happened to our aversion to a national domestic police force? One commentator 
cited Triggerlock as part of an “impending crisis in the federal justice system” 
that is “the product of a pervasive failure to recognize that federal courts are an 
exhaustible resource designed to play a specialized role in the justice system.”110 
In 1991, Chief Justice William Rehnquist lamented a proposal in Congress to 
expand federal jurisdiction even further over offenses committed with guns, 
writing that the law would be “inconsistent with long-accepted concepts of 
federalism” and “would swamp federal prosecutors” at the expense of other 
priorities.111  
Sara Sun Beale argued convincingly that two of the blockbuster Supreme 
Court opinions of the 1990s, United States v. Lopez and United States v. 
Morrison, which were widely viewed as part of a natural conservative effort to 
restrict the scope of the Commerce Clause and federal authority generally, are 
more properly seen as a tailored response to the Court’s concern about turning 
federal courts into “police courts,” reducing their exclusivity and diminishing 
 
L.J. 1431, 1441 (2017). 
 108 See Benjamin Weiser, Police in Gun Searches Face Disbelief in Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/12/nyregion/12guns.html. 
 109 David E. Patton, Federal Public Defense in an Age of Inquisition, 122 YALE L.J. 2578 (2013) 
 110 John S. Baker, Jr., State Police Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 673, 
699 (1999); Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 
HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1165 (2005); see also Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to 
Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 1006 (1995). 
 111 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 1991 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 5 (1992). 
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their prestige.112 The failure of an anticipated post-Lopez Commerce Clause 
revolution to materialize suggests she was right.  
E. High Costs and Few Benefits  
In assessing the costs and benefits of the prosecutions, a natural starting point 
is the stated rationale for them: violent crime reduction. There is no question that 
the stated goals of the prosecutions are grounded in utilitarian justifications. All 
of the statements by the law enforcement founders and proponents of the 
prosecutions tout their role in reducing violent crime.113 This is not surprising: 
Retributive rationales for federal prosecutions and harsh sentences are weak. 
There is nothing inherently wrong with possessing a gun in America. In fact, it 
is lauded by many as exercising a cherished constitutional right.114 It is only 
wrong to own a gun if you are a certain type of person, namely someone with a 
felony conviction. It is a regulatory rationale, a malum prohibitum offense, that 
depends on a determination that the people identified pose a risk worthy of 
criminal sanction (as opposed to, or in addition to, other forms of possible 
regulation).  
Given the stated utilitarian concerns, it ought to be of particular concern 
whether the prosecutions are in fact useful. That is, do they in fact improve 
public safety and drive down crime rates? As noted, the empirical research on 
the relationship between federal gun possession prosecutions and crime rates 
strongly suggests that the prosecutions have little to no impact. The research 
comports with more general scholarship about what works to reduce crime.  
There is near unanimity among scholars that of the potential means of 
deterring crime, certainty of detection is the most important and severity of 
punishment is the least important. People who engage in unlawful activity rarely 
engage in the sort of long-term cost/benefit calculation that would be necessary 
for increased amounts of punishment to impact decision-making. As I have 
written about previously, federal gun possession prosecutions are particularly 
vulnerable to deterrence critiques because they do nothing to increase the 
perceived odds of detection (which remains almost entirely dependent on local 
police activity).115 In addition, whatever small amount of deterrence might come 
from increased length of punishment is dependent on the person who might 
 
 112 Beale, supra note 1, at 1655–57. 
 113 MCGARRELL ET AL., supra note 51.  
 114 See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 115 Patton, supra note 1, at 1460. 
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potentially possess a gun to be aware of the punishment.116 Hurdles to the PSN-
targeted population’s knowledge of federal sentences and the possibility of 
federal prosecution are high. The vast majority of weapons and violent crime 
offenses are still prosecuted in state court.117 Anyone with a felony who is 
familiar with the court system is far more likely to be familiar with the state 
courts as opposed to federal courts.118 Plucking out a comparatively small 
number of cases to prosecute in federal court leads to what Sara Sun Beale long 
ago termed the “cruel lottery.”119 Not only is it cruel but it is likely ineffective.120 
A federal judge recently agreed with these principles. In 2017 in the Eastern 
District of New York, District Judge Jack Weinstein held an evidentiary hearing 
in a gun possession sentencing proceeding to determine whether the 
government’s claims about the deterrent effects of a lengthy prison sentence 
were justified.121 In concluding they were not, he relied heavily on the testimony 
of law professor and criminologist, Jeffrey Fagan, who explained the consensus 
view of empirical researchers that the “deterrent effect of criminal sanctions are 
specific to the risks of detection, not to the severity of punishments.”122 In other 
words, people are typically deterred by their perceived odds of getting caught, 
not how long their sentence might be. Judge Weinstein quoted at length from 
Dr. Fagan’s testimony in finding that a long sentence would serve neither a 
general nor a specific deterrent purpose: 
[Potential offenders] have no idea whether a case is going to be 
[prosecuted] if they’re caught . . . [T]hey have no way of estimating 
whether that case is going to be tried in federal court with a longer 
[sentence under a federal statute], or in a state court with a somewhat 
shorter sentence.  
. . . .  
I think it’s unlikely [for] Mr. Lawrence . . . under the theory of specific 
deterrence[] or in general for people in the . . . community in which 
Mr. Lawrence lives, that being given . . . an enhanced sentence, under 
the federal guidelines, under a federal statute, would have much of a 
deterrent effect either for him or in general in the community. Only 
were there to be extraordinary measures to disseminate that 
information would there be the possibility of deterrence. But all of the 
 
 116 Id. at 1432. 
 117 Id. at 1464. 
 118 Id. at 1442. 
 119 Beale, supra note 110, at 997. 
 120 Patton, supra note 1, at 1444. 
 121 United States v. Lawrence, 254 F. Supp. 3d 441 (E.D.N.Y. 2017). 
 122 Affidavit of Jeffrey Fagan at 3, United States v. Lawrence, 254 F. Supp. 3d 441 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 
16-cr-243). 
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research that we’ve done including on gun crimes suggest that even 
where there’s knowledge of lengthy sentences that’s not the key to 
deterrence. The key to deterrence is the risk of punishment.123 
Judge Weinstein’s findings comport with the overwhelming consensus of 
criminologists that severity of sentence (the primary justification for 
Triggerlock) does little, if anything, to deter crime.124 
Perhaps more surprising is that even some large-scale efforts to increase 
detection of firearms have shown weak results. The widespread practice of “stop 
and frisk” by police in New York City, in which police aggressively looked for 
excuses to stop and search enormous numbers of minority residents in mostly 
poor neighborhoods for the express purpose of finding guns, likely had no 
impact on crime rates.125 When the practice was discontinued after a federal 
judge found the practice unconstitutional, crime rates continued to fall—to 
levels not seen in at least sixty years.126 This is despite the fact that stops went 
from 685,724 at their height in 2011 to 11,627 in 2017.127 Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg has since apologized for the policy after years of defending it, saying 
now that he got it “really wrong.”128 
When stacked against the criticisms leveled above (racial disparity, 
contribution to mass incarceration, damage to traditional preference for state 
courts as a venue for local crime, and the erosion of personal liberty that comes 
from unconstitutional police searches), the lack of any clear benefit in crime 
reduction is particularly troubling.129  
III. THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL GUN POSSESSION PROSECUTIONS 
Federal gun possession prosecutions have proved remarkably durable 
despite the criticism from both the left and right.130 Of course, part of the 
 
 123 Lawrence, 254 F. Supp. 3d at 445–46. 
 124 See generally Patton, supra note 1. 
 125 Ashley Southall & Michael Gold, Why ‘Stop and Frisk’ Inflamed Black and Hispanic Neighborhoods, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/17/nyregion/bloomberg-stop-and-frisk-new-
york.html; see also Ames Grawert & James Cullen, Fact Sheet: Stop and Frisk’s Effect on Crime in New York 
City, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/fact-
sheet-stop-and-frisks-effect-crime-new-york-city; German Lopez, A Conservative Columnist Admits It: “We 
Were Wrong About Stop-and-Frisk”, VOX (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/1/8/ 
16865730/national-review-stop-and-frisk-police. 
 126 Southall & Gold, supra note 125. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 See supra Part II.A–D. 
 130 See Federal Weapons Prosecutions, supra note 22. 
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durability has been the praise from both the left and right. So, after thirty years, 
what have we learned that might provide lessons for the current moment? With 
talk of criminal justice reform from both sides of the political aisle, is there real 
potential to rethink federal prosecution of gun possession?  
Below, I discuss recent developments from each of the three branches and 
what they might mean for the future. 
A. Congress 
Congress is unlikely to revisit anytime soon the wisdom of the statutory basis 
for most federal gun prosecutions, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). There have not been any 
such proposals, and measures well short of repealing Section 922(g) have been 
met with heavy resistance.131 But there are realistic prospects for reforming some 
of the most draconian sentencing provisions relating to gun possession.  
Last year, Congress passed the First Step Act (FSA).132 Unlike the previous 
generation of criminal legal legislation, the FSA mostly reduced severity (albeit 
only slightly) through provisions that impact sentencing and corrections. 
Examples of the sentencing reform included the retroactive application of the 
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which somewhat (though not entirely) ameliorated 
the 100-to-1 crack to powder cocaine sentencing disparity (making it 18-to-1),133 
and a broadening of the so-called Safety Valve, allowing a slight expansion for 
a way out of mandatory minimum sentences for people charged with drug 
crimes.134  
With respect to firearms, there was one major reform: an amendment to part 
of the “stacking” provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).135 Recall from the discussion 
above that each “second or subsequent conviction” for Section 924(c) required 
an additional mandatory, consecutive twenty-five years.136 The Supreme Court 
interpreted that provision such that it did not require a previous final conviction 
 
 131 See, e.g., Tim Mack & Betsy Swan, Why Did Ted Cruz Suddenly Get Tough on Gun Possession?, 
DAILY BEAST (Oct. 26, 2015, 1:00 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/why-did-ted-cruz-suddenly-get-tough-
on-gun-possession; Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Sen. Tom Cotton’s Claim That Sentencing Reform Bill Would Release 
‘Thousands of Violent Felons’, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2016, 3:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
fact-checker/wp/2016/02/08/sen-tom-cottons-claim-that-sentencing-reform-bill-would-release-thousands-of-
violent-felons/. 
 132 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. 
 133 See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 110-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372; U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018 RESENTENCING PROVISIONS RETROACTIVITY DATA REPORT 1–2 (2019).  
 134 First Step Act § 402. 
 135 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012). 
 136 Id.  
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and could include multiple counts in the same indictment.137 In other words, a 
person charged with three counts of robbery or distributing drugs while 
possessing a firearm, would be sentenced to a mandatory term of fifty-five years 
in prison to be served consecutively to the sentence for the robbery or drug 
offense (and any other crime of conviction). This was so even if the person had 
committed all of the conduct on the same day (e.g., engaging in three separate 
drug transactions while possessing a gun). The First Step Act changed the 
“stacking” language to require that before the enhanced twenty-five-year 
sentence could be imposed, a prior conviction had to have “become final.”138 In 
other words, after the amendment the person in the example above would now 
face a fifteen-year mandatory, consecutive sentence (five plus five plus five) 
rather than the fifty-five years because none of the three separate drug 
transactions had resulted in a previously final conviction.  
The centerpiece of the corrections reform in the FSA is the establishment of 
an early release credit system that depends largely on two factors: a person’s risk 
assessment score (using an algorithmic tool that is currently being developed) 
and whether the offense of conviction excludes them from using the credits for 
early release. With respect to firearm offenses, people convicted under Section 
922(g) are not excluded from using the credits for early release, but those 
convicted under Section 924(c) are (as are roughly half of all federally 
incarcerated people based on their offense of conviction). It remains to be seen 
how a person’s past firearm possession may impact the algorithm in a way that 
could deny them release credits. 
The FSA is notable both for what it does and does not do in the area of 
firearms offenses. Earlier versions of the FSA took greater steps to ameliorate 
some of the harshest gun-related sentences. For instance, an earlier version of 
the bill which passed the Senate Judiciary Committee with bipartisan support 
would have made the FSA’s change to Section 924(c) retroactively applicable 
and would have reduced the enhanced twenty-five-year sentence to fifteen 
years.139 That bill would have also reduced the Armed Career Criminal Act 
(ACCA) mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years to ten years and made 
the provision retroactively applicable.140 The failure of Congress to do more than 
alleviate one of several extreme penalty provisions for firearms offenses 
 
 137 Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993). 
 138 First Step Act § 403. 
 139 S. 2123, 114th Cong. § 104 (2015). 
 140 Id.  
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suggests that meaningful legislation to reduce the scope of more typical gun 
possession cases is not likely anytime soon. 
Perhaps the most optimistic thing that can be said about the possibility of 
reducing high sentences for gun possession is that some lawmakers have 
proposed vehicles for sentence reduction that do not exclude firearm cases. For 
example, several 2020 Democratic presidential candidates have called for the 
elimination of mandatory minimums (without excluding gun possession 
penalties), and Senator Corey Booker has introduced the Second Look Act that 
would allow judges to revisit any sentence for people who have served over ten 
years.141 Those proposals would help ameliorate the harshest sentences for 
Section 924(c) and ACCA convictions, but they would likely have little impact 
on the vast majority of Triggerlock prosecutions, most of which do not involve 
mandatory minimum sentences. 
B. The Judiciary 
As with Congress, the prospects for a fundamental reshaping of federal gun 
prosecutions coming from the Judiciary are dim. Early on, the Supreme Court 
took a pass on the most obvious avenue to restricting the prosecutions by 
requiring little in the way of a real connection to interstate commerce.142 But like 
Congress, there have been incremental incursions by the Court with respect to 
the most draconian sentencing provisions and beyond that, a slight narrowing of 
the scope of Section 922(g).  
Three significant Supreme Court criminal cases in the past five years deal 
with firearms offenses. The first, Johnson v. United States,143 held that the so-
called “residual clause” of the ACCA was void for vagueness under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Recall that ACCA creates a mandatory 
minimum sentence of fifteen years for anyone illegally possessing a firearm after 
having been previously convicted of three “violent” felonies.144 The definition 
of a violent felony includes a list of enumerated offenses, an “elements clause,” 
and a residual clause that includes any felony that “involves conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”145 The initial 
 
 141 2020: The Democrats on Gun Control, MARSHALL PROJECT, https://www.themarshallproject.org/ 
2019/10/10/2020-the-democrats-on-criminal-justice (last updated Feb. 18, 2020) (listing each of the major 
candidates’ positions and noting Senator Booker’s Second Look proposal). 
 142 See, e.g., Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977) (holding that proof that a firearm had 
traveled at some point in interstate commerce was sufficient connection). 
 143 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2562–63 (2015). 
 144 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). 
 145 § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). 
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question presented was whether Johnson’s prior conviction for possessing a 
short-barreled shotgun qualified under the residual clause as a violent felony.146 
After granting certiorari, the Court sua sponte requested briefing on whether the 
residual clause was void for vagueness, even though the Court had quite recently 
(twice in the preceding eight years) considered and rejected that claim.147 The 
Court then answered the question in the affirmative, with Justice Scalia writing 
for the 6-3 majority.148  
And in the second case, United States v. Davis, the Supreme Court just last 
year in a 5-4 ruling extended Johnson’s vagueness analysis to Section 924(c)’s 
similarly worded residual clause, thus slightly narrowing one of the more 
draconian firearm penalty provisions.149 
The third case, Rehaif v. United States, applies directly to the bulk of 
Triggerlock cases because it addresses the mens rea requirement of Section 
922(g).150 The question presented was whether the government must show that 
the person charged knew “both that he engaged in the relevant conduct (that he 
possessed a firearm) and also that he fell within the relevant status (that he was 
a felon, an alien unlawfully in this country, or the like).” The Court answered 
yes, overruling lower courts’ near-unanimous views that the person need not 
know of their offending status. Although the decision adds to the government’s 
burden and will help some defendants, it is not likely to impact the vast majority 
of cases in which prosecutors will have a relatively easy time proving a 
person’sknowledge of their own prior felony conviction. 
In trying to discern the Court’s jurisprudence surrounding federal gun 
possession prosecutions, a key question is whether the Court’s analysis should 
be taken at face value or whether, similar to some interpretations of Lopez from 
twenty-five years ago, the analysis should be seen as a reflection of the Court’s 
view of other policy aspects of the prosecutions and sentences.151 There are 
grounds for both views. 
The face-value interpretation has plenty of support. The Rehaif majority 
opinion was grounded in straightforward statutory interpretation without 
broader discussion of the scope or wisdom of Triggerlock prosecutions. And 
several decisions following Johnson indicate that it was not necessarily driven 
 
 146 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556. 
 147 Id. at 2580. 
 148 Id. at 2563. 
 149 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). 
 150 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019). 
 151 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Beale, supra note 2. 
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by gun-related policy concerns. For instance, the Court applied the Johnson 
reasoning to a non-gun-related issue, the definition of crimes of violence in the 
immigration context in Sessions v. Dimaya, and it failed to extend Johnson to 
federal sentencing guidelines and the guidelines’ career offender provision in 
Beckles v. United States.152 To the extent Johnson was influenced by the Court’s 
displeasure with federal involvement in prosecuting gun possession cases or the 
extreme severity of the sentences, the decisions in Dimaya and Beckles need not 
have been decided as they were. There were ways for the Court to distinguish 
Johnson’s analysis in the immigration context (by holding that a more relaxed 
civil vagueness standard applied to immigration statutes) and for it to apply the 
analysis in the guidelines context (by finding, as Justice Sotomayor argued in 
concurrence, that because sentences are “anchored” by the guidelines, they too 
are susceptible to vagueness challenge despite their non-binding nature).153  
But the policy-influence interpretation has support as well. To begin, Justice 
Kavanaugh starts his dissent in Davis with the following: 
Crime and firearms form a dangerous mix. From the 1960s through the 
1980s, violent gun crime was rampant in America. The wave of 
violence destroyed lives and devastated communities, particularly in 
America’s cities. Between 1963 and 1968, annual murders with 
firearms rose by a staggering 87 percent, and annual aggravated 
assaults with firearms increased by more than 230 percent.154 
The opening continues with five more paragraphs detailing gun violence 
statistics and the rising and falling of crime rates.155 “[A]fter 33 years and tens 
of thousands of federal prosecutions, the Court suddenly finds a key provision 
of § 924(c) to be unconstitutional because it is supposedly too vague.”156 Justice 
Alito is similarly animated in his dissent in Rehaif, stating his displeasure with 
narrowing Section 922(g)’s scope because “it probably does more to combat gun 
violence than any other federal law.”157 To say that the dissents in both cases 
were influenced by policy considerations would be a vast understatement.  
But how much were the justices in the majority influenced in the same way? 
Was their analysis colored by the extraordinary sentences that come with ACCA 
and Section 924(c) and the public discourse from all sides of the political 
spectrum about mass incarceration? Or was it affected by studies refuting the 
 
 152 Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018); Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017). 
 153 Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 903 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 154 United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 155 Id. at 2337 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 156 Id. (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 157 Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2201 (2019). 
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impact of federal firearm prosecutions on reducing crime as argued by Justices 
Kavanaugh and Alito? If so, the indications are less obvious than the dissents’ 
explicitly policy-driven view.  
Although the cases are significant for the reasons discussed, Johnson, Davis, 
and Rehaif are not likely to have much of an impact on the vast majority of gun 
possession prosecutions. They will trim back some of the worst excesses of the 
ACCA and Section 924(c), but they will not slow typical felon-in-possession 
cases. Absent an unlikely about-face on the low interstate commerce bar, the 
only realistic hope for the Judiciary to impact gun possession prosecutions is to 
address the central reason for the existence of the PSN programs: severe 
sentences. And that will likely need to come from the district courts employing 
the reasoning of Judge Weinstein in Lawrence discussed above.158 If accepted 
more broadly, Judge Weinstein’s conclusions would remove the primary reason 
for federal gun prosecutions: improved public safety from the deterrent effects 
of lengthy sentences.  
Time will tell if federal judges begin to seriously examine the utilitarian 
justifications for gun possession prosecutions. If they do, the impact could be far 
more significant than the better known Supreme Court cases.  
C. The Executive 
Absent dramatic and surprising action from Congress or the Judiciary, a real 
scaling back on federal gun prosecutions can only come from the place where 
they began: the Department of Justice. As noted, the prosecutions did not begin 
with a new law.159 The ramping up in the 1990s and steady increases in the 2000s 
were almost entirely prosecutor-driven.160 The prosecutorial initiatives were 
spurred by the small area of overlap in the Venn diagram of gun control politics: 
conservative tough-on-crime policies and efforts to stave off broader regulation 
crossing paths with the liberal desire to take action where possible and ward off 
criticism from the right about enforcing the laws already on the books.161 That 
bipartisan agreement led to a dramatic, and largely unquestioned, increase in 
prison sentences for poor people of color.162  
 
 158 Supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.  
 159 See supra notes 2–9 and accompanying text. 
 160 See supra Part I.A–B. 
 161 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 162 Supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. 
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The question now is whether the “progressive prosecutor” movement in 
some cities and “smart on crime” policies embraced by some conservatives will 
extend to federal gun possession prosecutions. Thus far, there is little to suggest 
they will. Even during the Obama Administration, when the number of firearm 
prosecutions dipped from the Bush Administration highs, they were still 51% 
higher than the last year of the Clinton Administration and were on an upward 
trajectory from 2015 to 2016.163 The slight movement toward more progressive 
policies under the Holder- and Lynch-led Justice Departments (most notably, 
somewhat less frequent use of mandatory minimum sentences in drug cases and 
a reduction in authorized death penalty cases)164 did not include a revision to 
Triggerlock prosecutions—or even to the “disreputable” stash-house sting 
cases.165 Indeed, gun possession remained an exclusionary factor for the criteria 
announced by Attorney General Holder allowing prosecutors to charge below a 
mandatory minimum in certain drug cases.166  
Under the Trump Administration, gun possession prosecutions have 
continued their rise from the end of the Obama Administration. In his first year 
as Attorney General, Jeff Sessions announced that he was “taking steps to 
strengthen the PSN program and making clear that it is a Department 
priority.”167 In response, federal prosecutors around the country have ratcheted 
up gun possession prosecutions, with Fiscal Year 2019 on track to be the highest 
total ever, surpassing the previous high in 2004.168 A recent press release from 
the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Chicago quoted Attorney General William Barr 
touting the “revitalized Project Safe Neighborhoods program” and citing an 
extraordinary increase in “federal firearm defendants” in the Northern District 
of Illinois:  
According to preliminary data for the 2019 Fiscal Year, which ended 
September 30, 2019, the U.S. Attorney’s Office charged more federal 
firearm defendants than were charged in each of the prior 15 years. 
 
 163 Federal Weapons Prosecutions, supra note 22 (showing prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 922 were 
4,461 in FY 2000 and 6,734 in FY 2016). 
 164 See Memorandum from Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., to U.S. Att’ys and Assistant Att’y Gen. for the 
Criminal Div., Department Policy on Charging Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Recidivist Enhancements 
in Certain Drug Cases (Aug. 12, 2013).  
 165 United States v. Kindle, 698 F.3d 401, 414 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., concurring) (describing stash-
house stings as a “disreputable tactic”). 
 166 Memorandum, supra note 164 (listing criteria to “decline to charge the quantity necessary to trigger a 
mandatory minimum” in drug cases and including “the defendant’s relevant conduct does not involve . . . 
possession of a weapon”).  
 167 Memorandum from Jefferson Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., to all U.S. Att’ys, Project Safe Neighborhoods 
(Oct. 4, 2017). 
 168 Federal Weapons Prosecutions, supra note 22. 
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The number of charged firearm defendants in Fiscal Year 2019 was 
44% higher than 2018, and 60% higher than 2017, according to 
preliminary data.169 
Looking to the future, if Trump is reelected, there is every reason to think the 
high numbers of prosecutions will continue. If a Democrat is elected, the picture 
is cloudier as none of the nominees have spoken to the issue even as they propose 
broad “criminal justice reform” policies generally.170  
Regardless of who controls the White House, one possible source of 
pushback on the prosecutions are the state and local partners upon whom the 
PSN programs depend. As noted, the majority of federal gun possession 
prosecutions arise from arrests by local police.171 The U.S. Attorneys’ Offices 
are often only aware of the cases because of their coordination with local police 
and prosecutors. Absent that coordination, many cases could not be charged 
federally. There are some signs already that local authorities are rethinking their 
cooperation with federal joint task forces because of federal rules that conflict 
with reform-minded police departments’ and district attorneys’ offices rules.172 
At least five cities—Atlanta, Houston, San Francisco, Portland, and St. Paul—
have pulled out of joint task forces because of concerns about improper use of 
force, prohibitions on the use of body cameras, and a general lack of 
transparency in investigating troubling law enforcement incidents.173 Might 
cooperation on gun possession cases be next?  
In order for either local or federal prosecutors to scale back on gun 
possession prosecutions, they will need to view them (or their political base will 
need to insist that they view them) as needing reform in the same way that so 
many other areas need reform. Can criminal justice advocates on either side of 
the political aisle be convinced to push on this topic as strongly as they have 
pushed on mandatory minimums, bail, marijuana, or police violence? And if so, 
will those being pushed feel the need to listen? Thus far, we have not seen it. 
 
 169 Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Office N. Dist. Ill., U.S. Attorney’s Office Announces Progress and 
Ongoing Strategies in Combating Violent Crime in Chicago (Oct. 24, 2019). 
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 171 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 172 Simone Weichselbaum, Why Some Police Departments are Leaving Federal Task Forces, MARSHALL 
PROJECT (Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/10/31/why-some-police-departments-are-
leaving-federal-task-forces. 
 173 Id. 
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Neither Holder nor Lynch (nor any of the Obama-era U.S. Attorneys) could 
remotely be compared to reformist district attorneys like Larry Krasner in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania or Wesley Bell in Ferguson, Missouri.174 And the 
criminal justice advocacy groups have not highlighted gun prosecutions as an 
issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Guns will test the resolve of criminal justice reformers on the left and right. 
Those on the left will need to stop supporting severe criminal sanctions as an 
acceptable policy response to social ills like gun violence. It will require a 
recognition that mass incarceration cannot be solved by only decrying 
prosecutions for offenses out of favor on the left, like non-violent drug offenses. 
And the right will need to apply the same big government skepticism and 
empirical scrutiny of taxpayer expenditures even when that scrutiny is at odds 
with tough on crime rhetoric or the NRA’s strategy of forestalling broader gun 
control measures. Those are steep hills for both sides to climb. Perhaps the small 
steps that have been taken in other areas will provide a path. 
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